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The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activismt
JA~ms L. CooPER*
INTRODUCTION
Although concern about the role and behavior of attorneys representing
the state is neither a new nor a distinctly American problem,' it has been
a relatively infrequent matter of public debate. After the election of
President Reagan in 1980 however, the Solicitor General's Office in
general, and Solicitor General Charles Fried in particular, became the
focus of an expanding debate about the place of advocacy and politics in
the arguments of those who represent the federal government before the
Supreme Court. Amicus filings by Solicitor General Fried in both abortion 2
and establishment clause3 cases have precipitated a vigorous examination
of the role of the Solicitor General in the pursuit of executive policy.4
Relying almost entirely on anecdotal evidence,5 both sides of this dispute
t © Copyright 1990 by James L. Cooper.
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Ph.D. Candidate 1992, Indiana University at Bloomington; A.B.,
1986, A.M., 1987, University of Chicago.
1. Great Britain's first Labour government was brought down by the public outcry
following the Attorney-General's political exercise of his prosecutorial discretion. See J.
EDWARDS, THE LAW OFICER OF THE CRowN 199-225 (1964).
2. President Reagan campaigned against the Court's holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). Although the Justice Department had not filed a brief in Roe or subsequent
abortion cases, the Reagan Solicitors General began to file briefs in these cases, first arguing
to limit Roe and then to overrule it. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-
746) (Roe should be limited) with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-
495, 83-1379) (Roe should be overruled).
3. President Reagan also supported limiting the establishment clause. See, e.g., Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534
(1986) (No. 84-773).
4. Some commentators felt that Fried halfheartedly pushed the Reagan political agenda
in the Court. "You either serve your master ... or you resign." Freiwald, Right Turns
Against Fried, Legal Times, May 18, 1987, at 13, col. 2 (quoting Daniel Popeo, general counsel
of the Washington Legal Foundation).
5. In fact, with the notable exception of L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JusncE: THE SoLlcrroR
GENERAL AND TH RuL oF LAW (Vintage ed. 1988), almost all of the literature regarding the
Solicitor General Office consists of the observations of former Solicitors General or assistants.
See, e.g., Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 Cm. B. Rc. 221 (1963); Griswold,
The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of the United States Before
the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REv. 527 (1969); Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics,
Polemics & Principle, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 595 (1986); McConnell, The Rule of Law and the
Role of the Solicitor General, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1105 (1988); McCree, The Solicitor General
and his Client, 59 WAsH. U.L.Q. 337 (1981); Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor
General's Independence, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1119 (1988); Sobeloff, The Law Business of
the United States, 34 OR. L. REv. 145 (1955); Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation,
64 HAnv. L. REv. 759 (1951); Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor
General, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1167 (1988).
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make claims about the nature and propriety of Charles Fried's behavior
as Solicitor General in light of the design and history of the Office.
6
Underlying this dispute is the inherent tension in the nature of the
Solicitor General's Office. Both the statutory structure and the traditional
function of the Office work to make the Solicitor General an agent of
several diverse principals. While the most explicit among these is the
executive branch, specifically the Attorney General and the President, they
also include the Supreme Court and a positive legal ideal which has
variously been labeled "the rule of law, ' 7 or more simply "justice." '
Given the complexity of working under these disparate masters, it is
inevitable that as each pressures the Solicitor General, the goals of the
others will suffer. 9 Anytime the executive branch has a particular concern
with the development of the law, therefore, the Solicitor General is likely
to feel heightened pressure to bring the government's legal arguments in
line with the administration's policy goals. Should the Solicitor General
respond to that pressure, we might expect both the Supreme Court and
those who see the change as a violation of "careful legal reasoning" to
disapprove. Observers of Fried's tenure as Solicitor General (and to some
extent that of his predecessor Rex Lee), have suggested that this politici-
zation has occurred; that the Solicitor General has become overly active
at the behest of a political agenda.' 0 In response, Fried's supporters have
both denied the allegations" and argued in the alternative that a politically
active Solicitor General is not new.'
2
6. Although Charles Fried resigned as Solicitor General in June 1989, his successor in
the Bush administration, Kenneth Starr, has continued to file amicus briefs in areas of
attenuated federal interest such as abortion. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Hodgson v. Minnesota (U.S. 1989) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309) (The government argues
that requirement of parental notification before abortion is constitutional and urges reversal
of Roe v. Wade).
7. L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at xiv.
8. In a brief confessing error by the lower court, Solicitor General Frederick Lehmann
wrote: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."
Id. at 17 n.45. His words have been inscribed on the walls of the Justice Department
Building.
9. "I have frankly concluded that it is virtually impossible in today's world to occupy
a position like solicitor general without, on the one hand, incurring the disfavor of some
groups with very strong ideological views or, on the other hand, impairing your credibility
with the Court .... " Freiwald, supra note 4, at 13, col. 2 (quoting former Reagan Solicitor
General Rex Lee).
10. L. CAPLAN, supra note 5; see also Lauter, A Champion of the Reagan Agenda, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Lauter, How 'Successful' Is the New Solicitor General?,
Nat'l L.J., June 9, 1986, at 5, col. 1; Caplan, An Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's
Office Become Politicized?, Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 22, col. 3.
11. See, e.g., Lauber, An Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's Office Become Polit-
icized?, Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 22, col. I ("Although the political pressures brought
to bear on the solicitor general have concededly been tremendous, Rex Lee and Charles
Fried have in my view successfully upheld the office's longstanding commitment to the rule
of law.").
12. See, e.g., Note, Mixing Politics and Justice: The Office of Solicitor General, 4 J.
L. & PoL. 379, 420 (1987).
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This Note presents an empirical examination of the "activism" of the
Solicitor General where the government has filed as an amicus curiae in
the Supreme Court. In order to evaluate the current amicus practices of
the Solicitor General, I consider the federal interest in cases in which the
government participated from the 1984 through the 1987 Supreme Court
terms, as well as two other periods of alleged executive activism: the New
Deal struggle between President Roosevelt and the Court, 3 and the pre-
legislative civil rights period marked by Brown v. Board of Education.14
The data show that the Reagan Solicitors General were not the first to
file amicus briefs in cases with no significant federal interest, though they
oversaw an expansion in the extent and breadth of federal amicus filings.
Perhaps more importantly, however, these more aggressive briefs do not
appear to have had any significant adverse effects on the Supreme Court's
relationship with the Solicitor General.
I. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Although the idea of formal legal representation for the head of gov-
ernment predates the ratification of the Constitution,'5 the fundamental
nature of the position in American government was cast by that event.
The Constitution delegated to the executive branch the responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ..... "I Toward that end,
in 1789 Congress created the position of Attorney General and directed
him "to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which
the United States shall be concerned . "... '" Eventually important, but
left unspecified at the time, was the ambit of the term "concern."' 8 At
the time, there was little need to make explicit the sorts of cases the
Attorney General might choose to enter because procedural traditions left
him with little discretion. Where the United States was a party, the
statutory language was clear that the Attorney General should direct the
representation. Where this was not the case, however, there were few
13. See infra text accompanying note 64.
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
15. The idea of a designated attorney for the state dates at least to mid-thirteenth century
England. See generally J. EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1984); J. EDWARDS, supra note 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
18. This may have been intentional. See L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTmENT OF JusTaC 7
(1967) ("As prescribed by the Judiciary Act, the duties and powers of the Office of Attorney
General were few and vaguely defined and reflected the legislators' concern lest the office
become a center of federal power that would infringe upon the prerogatives of the states.").
1990]
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formal options-the amicus curiae brief would not appear for several
decades. 9 Perhaps the only alternative was for the Attorney General to
take the case as part of his private practice. 20 Further constraints on the
Attorney General's ability to expand the reach of his Office included the
lack of staff2' and the increasing decentralization of government legal
services. The latter finally grew to such proportions as to demand con-
gressional action.
As the government expanded, each new department developed its own
independent legal staff. Consequently, although the Attorney General
conducted all the government's business in the Supreme Court, the legal
opinions of the government's departments and agencies were not uniform.2
Congress created the Department of Justice in 1870 in an effort to solve
this problem by centralizing the government's legal services. The Attorney
General directed the new department which was composed of attorneys
who had been dispersed throughout the government. Rather than asking
the Attorney General to continue as the government's litigator in addition
to his presidential advisory role and his newly created administrative
responsibilities, Congress created the Office of the Solicitor General to
assist the Attorney General by "conduct[ing] and argu[ing] any case in
which the government is interested .... "-2 This legislation subtly changed
the prerogative of the government's counsel to include not just those cases
in which the government was "concerned, ' 24 but also those in which it
19. The amicus curiae brief made its first formal appearance in the American legal
system in Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). Before Green, the Court allowed
third party participation only in rare and informal circumstances. In Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), for example, the Court would not allow Attorney General Randolph
to participate ex officio although the case did involve a federal statute. Id. at 409. Until
Green the only means of third party participation Was the filing of a "suggestion." See,
e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117-18 (1812). See
generally Krislov, The Amicus Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 700
(1963).
20. Until 1853, the Attorney General occupied the office only part time and had a
concurrent private practice. When the government lacked standing, the Attorney General
could instead represent a private party with the same interests that did have standing. See,
e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Although Hayburn's Case was mooted
by Congress, Attorney General Randolph offered to serve as Hayburn's attorney to pursue
the government's goals. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409; see Krislov, supra note
19, at 699.
21. The Attorney General had no legal assistance until 1858 when Congress authorized
the hiring of two additional staff lawyers. L. HUSTON, supra note 18, at 10.
22. "[W]e have found that there has been a most unfortunate result from this separation
of law powers. We find one interpretation of the laws of the United States in one Department
and another interpretation in another Department." CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
3036 (1870) (statement of Representative Jenckes).
23. An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 5, 16 Stat. 162, 163
(1870); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1989) (describing the general functions of the Office
of the Solicitor General).
24. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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was "interested. '"2 The latter remains the standard today.26
A. Functions of the Solicitor General's Office
As director of the government's Supreme Court litigation, the Solicitor
General has three major responsibilities. They are (1) to decide when the
government ought to seek review by the Supreme Court after it has lost
a case in any appellate court;27 (2) to present or oversee the government's
arguments when it is a party before the Supreme Court;2 and (3) to
present the government's views as amicus curiae in those cases of interest
where the government is not a party.29 During the Supreme Court's 1984
term,30 the staff of twenty-three attorneys handled 1,884 cases.3'
The first of these duties, the decision to seek certiorari or appeal, is
almost entirely at the discretion of the Solicitor General.32 In each case, the
Appellate Section of the Justice Department that handled the case makes a
recommendation. Where that recommendation is positive, the Solicitor
General's staff examines the entire case record and makes its own recom-
mendation. Finally, the Solicitor General himself reviews both recommen-
dations as well as the record of the case and makes the final decision. 33
25. An interesting though largely unexplored issue concerns the extent of this "interest"
and whether it in any way supercedes a court's general duty to protect (or at least consider)
the public interest. At least one court has suggested that the Attorney General's interest
(and thus the Solicitor General's interest) in the public welfare is essentially coequal to that
of the judicial system. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found.,
146 F.2d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
Other courts, however, have required a more distinctly governmental interest before
allowing the government's participation or intervention. See, e.g., Calhoun County, Fla. v.
Roberts, 137 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1943); United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079,
1084 (D. Ala. 1970).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1982).
27. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1989).
28. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1989).
29. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (1989).
30. July 6, 1984 to July 2, 1985.
31. 1984 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
32. Among the factors that weigh on the Solicitor General's determination of a case's
"certworthiness" are:
1. whether [it] presents only one legal question, with noncontroversial facts;
2. the prestige of the circuit judge writing the adverse opinion;
3. the known attitude of the Court towards the particular activity, agency, or
area of law; and
4. most important, the possibility of winning the case-it is better to lose many
times in the Court of Appeals on an issue than to lose once in the Supreme
Court.
W. Brigman, The Office of the Solicitor General of the United States 125-26 (1966)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
33. Former Solicitor General Griswold remarked:
If the district court in Oklahoma City makes a decision which the United States
Attorney doesn't like, he may well tell the press, "I am going to appeal."
19901
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Typically, the government seeks review of only a small percentage of the
cases it has lost.3 4
The Solicitor General enjoys even greater discretion in decisions to file
amicus curiae briefs. While the Court frequently invites the Solicitor General
to file an amicus brief-invitations which are treated like orders31-where
the government acts sua sponte it does not confront the barriers that other
parties do. Supreme Court Rule 36, governing the filing of amicus curiae
briefs, requires that amici obtain the consent of either the parties or the
Court before filing.3 6 Any brief presented by the United States, however, is
exempt from the consent requirement. 37 Though the Solicitor General has
been required to state the government's interest in the case since 1970,38 he
is free to submit briefs in any case he chooses.
B. The Solicitor General and the Agency Problem
Although the Solicitor General has a large degree of discretion in the
control and function of his Office, he is not entirely free. Like all public
officials, the Solicitor General is constrained by those who exercise, de jure
When I see those statements in the press, I say to myself, "Yes, he is going
to appeal if I say he can." But sometimes I don't.
Griswold, Constitutional Cases in the Supreme Court, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 353, 354 (1971).
One researcher has suggested that there are no consistent features in the substance of the
cases that are selected for certiorari petition by the Solicitor General. This supports the
theory that certiorari decisions by the Solicitor General are made on a case-by-case basis in
a discretionary manner. W. Brigman, supra note 32, at 146.
34. During the 1985 Supreme Court term, for instance, the government sought Supreme
Court review in eight percent of the 720 cases it lost at the appellate level. Solicitor General's
Office: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7 (1987) (statement of Charles Fried).
35. See S. Puro, The Role of the Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme Court:
1920-1966, 135-36 (February 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New
York, Buffalo).
36. SuP. CT. R. 36.1. The use of amicus briefs among all litigants in the Supreme Court
has increased dramatically since 1935, culminating in a record 78 amicus briefs filed in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). The previous record was
58 amicus briefs filed in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). For many interest groups, these briefs have become a cost-efficient substitute for
full litigation. What began as a procedure to inform the Court has become a "cottage
industry." High Court has 78 'Friends' in Abortion Case, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 5,
col. 3 (quoting Professor Howard).
37. Sup. CT. R. 36.4.
38. In 1970, the Supreme Court Rules were changed to require a statement of interest
in the amicus brief itself rather than in the motion for permission. Since the government
does not need to file a motion for permission, this change in the Rules effectively forced
the government to state explicitly its interests in the case. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at
196 n.41.
The government, however, often made its interests explicit even before the rule change.
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.
Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1957) (No. 75).
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or de facto, some control over his actions. For the Solicitor General, the
clearest and most important institutional linkage is with the President. It is
the President who, by statute, nominates the Solicitor General and at whose
pleasure he serves.3 9 Should he care to, therefore, the President has the
coercive leverage to direct the activities of even a reticent Solicitor General °
For several reasons, however, this kind of immediate direction is rarely
exercised. First and most importantly, the President often chooses a Solicitor
General who shares his political values. Solicitor General Charles Fried has
commented, "I have no trouble saying what the Attorney General and his
crew want me to, because I'm more conservative than they are."' 41 Thus a
President may avoid the need for day-to-day control through carefully
selecting the nominee. A second reason is that most of the Solicitor General's
work is politically routine. 42 In most cases, where the government is a party,
the political value of the dispute is limited. Indeed, even in many amicus
appearances, the issues are rather apolitical and unlikely to be of special
interest to the President. Finally, when the President does take an interest
in a particular case, the bureaucracy may shield the Solicitor General from
administration pressure.43
39. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1988).
40. Presidential control of this kind was noted during deliberations on the Act to Establish
a Department of Justice, the same Act that created the Solicitor General's Office. "[Recall]
a former President who sent word to his Attorney General that if he could not find law
for a particular policy he (the President) would find an Attorney General who could find
law for it." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870) (statement of Representative
Maynard).
41. L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 150 (quoting Solicitor General Fried). Rex Lee similarly
suggested that he supported all Reagan policies. Jenkins, The Solicitor General's Winning
Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734, 736 (1983). Although a Solicitor General in the same political
camp as the President may appear to be a better agent, the improvement is born of
coincidence rather than better agency. This sort of relationship is vulnerable to changes or
a divergence in perspective between the Solicitor General and the President. Though less
sustainable, this is the same problem that occasionally haunts Presidents and their judicial
appointees. As Professor Tribe observes, cases of apparent bad agency on the Court are
generally the result of Presidents who choose appointees for contemporary, sometimes short-
term, purposes. L. TIBE, GOD SAVE Trns HONORABLE COuRtT: How THE CHOICE OF SuIPREmE
COURT JusnicEs SA.PES OuR HISTORY, 59-92 (1985). Unlike a Supreme Court Justice,
however, the President may fire the Solicitor General for the same divergence in views.
42. Former Deputy Solicitor General Frey remarked, "About 95 percent of the work of
the office has no significant political ingredient . . . . 'The key questions are how were the
decisions made in abortion cases or affirmative action cases-those cases where the issues
coincide with the ideological concerns of the administration."' Coyle, Starr Potential, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 22, col. 3 (citing and quoting Frey).
43. See, e.g., G. BELL with R. OsmRow, TAKrNr CARE OF THE LAW (1982). Attorney
General Griffin Bell protected Solicitor General McCree from administrative pressure during
the drafting of the government's amicus brief in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. G. BELL, supra,
at 31. But see L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 81-114 (Assistant Attorney General William
Bradford Reynolds pressured Solicitor General Rex Lee to promote the Reagan administra-
tion's policy goals.).
1990]
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Pulling the Solicitor General in a different direction is his traditional
closeness to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's influence is not
statutory, but customary. In 1984, the Solicitor General was involved in a
staggering thirty-eight percent of the cases on the Court's docket. 44 Of just
those 175 cases that were argued on the merits the government participated
or submitted briefs in sixty-five percent. The Solicitor General himself
appears before the Court more than any other lawyer or law firm. At the
same time, the Solicitor General litigates exclusively in the Supreme Court-
the Court is as important to the Solicitor General's business as he is to its.
In addition to their institutional familiarity, each party in this symbiotic
relationship reaps important benefits. Perhaps the most valuable benefit to
the Court is the Solicitor General's careful screening of cases before allowing
the government to seek Supreme Court review. Without this check, the
already busy Court would be flooded by petitions for review from innu-
merable federal officials. The Court has acknowledged, both publicly4" and
privately46 the importance of this "gatekeeping" function to the management
of its docket.
The Solicitor General further assists the Court by responding to the
Court's invitations to file amicus briefs. Although the Solicitor General files
without invitation, each year a significant percentage, often a majority, of
the government's amicus briefs are filed in response to an invitation by the
44. Of the 5,006 cases on the Court's docket, the Solicitor General was involved in
1,888. 1984 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
45. See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
Without the centralization of the decision whether to seek certiorari, this Court
might well be deluged with petitions from every federal prosecutor, agency, or
instrumentality, urging as the position of the United States, a variety of
inconsistent positions shaped by the immediate demands of the case sub judice,
rather than by longer-term interests in the development of the law.
Id. at 1510.
In United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), the Court refused to apply collateral
estoppel to the United States. The Court noted the importance to its docket of the Solicitor
General's control of the federal government's appellate litigation.
The Solicitor General's policy for determining when to appeal an adverse
decision would also require substantial revision. The Court of Appeals faulted
the Government in this case for failing to appeal a decision that it now contends
is erroneous. But the Government's litigation conduct in a case is apt to differ
from that of a private litigant. Unlike a private litigant who generally does not
forgo an appeal if he believes that he can prevail, the Solicitor General considers
a variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the Government and the
crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal. The application
of nonmutual estoppel against the government would force the Solicitor General
to abandon those prudential concerns and to appeal every adverse decision in
order to avoid foreclosing further review.
Id. at 160-61 (citations omitted). The Court has dubbed the Solicitor General a quasi-judicial
agent, in the process granting the government a significant litigation advantage that private
parties do not enjoy. See generally Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1123-46.
46. H. Perry, Indicies and Signals in the Certiorari Process 19 (April 9-11, 1986) (paper
presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois).
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Court.47 The government's amicus briefs may give the Court an indication
of the administration's position on a particularly divisive case, 4 an alter-
native to the reasoning the parties have proposed, or simply the benefit of
an informed interpretation of a particular piece of legislation or other
federal code. The traditionally high quality of the Solicitor General's legal
work has encouraged the Court to continue to solicit amicus briefs.
49
In the only court it graces, the Solicitor General's Office has consistently
enjoyed great success. Each year almost 80 percent of the government's
petitions for certiorari are granted and in 80 percent of those cases the
government's position on the merits is supported. 0 While this success ratio
would be astonishing for an individual litigator, it is less so for a repeat
institutional litigator. 1 As the court of last review, the Supreme Court
receives many frivolous or weak private petitions for certiorari. Unlike the
Solicitor General, most private parties have little to lose by asking for the
Court's review. A private party's interest is not in the long-term development
47. In 1987, 38% of the Solicitor General's 32 amicus briefs in cases that resulted in
opinions on the merits were in response to invitations.
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also infra text
accompanying notes 89-93.
49. H. Perry, supra note 46, at 19 (One Supreme Court clerk refers to Solicitor General's
brief as "the answer sheet."). Even Solicitor General Fried's critics acknowledge the technical
competence of the Office under his administration. See, e.g., Solicitor General's Office:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 43 (1987) (statement of Professor Burt Neuborne).
50. See, e.g., 1984 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
51. Political scientists and legal scholars have widely noted that repeat players of a game
(here litigation), often develop different strategies and goals than do their "one-shot"
counterparts. Repeat players also have opportunities their unitary counterparts do not. See
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974); see also R. AxELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND
THIR DEALERS (1966).
Professor Galanter lists a number of advantages enjoyed by repeat players, notably the
ability to adopt strategies that minimize the maximum loss, and to play for rules instead of
outcomes. Galanter, supra, at 99-100. The Solicitor General is able to minimize his overall
losses by not appealing cases lost in lower courts that might be affirmed by the Supreme
Court and thus cover the whole country rather than just one circuit. Carrington, United
States Appeals in Civil Cases, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1102 (1974). Moreover, the Solicitor
General is able to play for rules affecting litigation procedure such as the exemption from
collateral estoppel won in Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 154. See supra note 45. The Solicitor
General also may efficiently devote resources to seek rule changes other than by judicial
decision. Supreme Court Rules 36.4 (waives the general amicus brief consent requirement
for the Solicitor General) and 28.4(b) (allows the Solicitor General to intervene when the
constitutionality of a federal statute is impugned) are examples.
Of course a repeat player may have some special duty to more lofty ends than one-shot
litigants. Indeed former Solicitor General Lee suggested this is especially true for the Solicitor
General. "ET]he government lawyer must be more sensitive to the values on the other side
of the lawsuit than is true of lawyers in general." Lee, supra note 5, at 596. He does note,




of the law, or in the preservation of the Court's institutional integrity, but
rather in the success of her particular case. The Solicitor General, by
contrast, would exhaust both his staff and the Supreme Court if he pursued
every case the government lost. Instead, only the strongest of the govern-
ment's cases are allowed to go forward-those the Court is both likely to
hear and likely to rule on favorably.
The Court's inability to give exhaustive consideration to each petition for
review52 encourages it to use authorship as a "quality cue."' 53 Repeat players
such as the Solicitor General are especially likely to emerge favorably from
such a process. The Court has historically found the Solicitor General's
advice to be helpful, which has evolved into the Solicitor General's signature
serving as a sort of legal brand name: a quick assurance of quality. Both
the Court and the Solicitor General accrue benefits from this state of affairs.
The general quality of the government's legal work allows the Supreme
Court to relax the thoroughness of its review and use its scarce resources
in other ways. The government, in turn, enjoys prestige in the Court as
well as an occasional opportunity to pursue political ends rather than the
"rule of law." There may be, in other words, room for some political
grandstanding as long as it is not frequent enough to undermine the Court's
.general confidence in the Solicitor General.5 4
52. One manifestation of this problem is the "cert. pool" in which six Justices pool their
law clerks to allow less time consuming consideration of certiorari petitions. See W. REHNQUIST,
THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 263-66 (1987).
53. See Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions on
Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185 (1979); Tanenhaus, Schick, Maraskin & Rosen, The Supreme
Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (G. Schubert ed.
1963); see also R. STERN, E. GIESSMAN & S. SAIRo, SUPErM COURT PRACTICE 573 (6th
ed. 1986) ("The number [of amicus briefs] is so great that most of the Justices have their
law clerks sift out the briefs . . ").
Cues, a sort of brand name, are generally established over time. See High Court Has 78
"Friends" in Abortion Case, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 5, col. 1 (quoting Professor Kellet)
("There are certain groups and individuals the [C]ourt pays particular attention to because
they have built up a certain credibility with the [C]ourt over the years.").
54. Because the Court does not know the quality of the Solicitor General's advice until
it has already agreed to hear the case, there is an "informational assymetry" in the Solicitor
General's favor. He knows, before the Court does, whether his advice is politically motivated.
This sort of problem has been labeled the "lemon principle" in other contexts. Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN.
488 (1970). The principle holds that where the seller has more information about a relatively
fungible good than does the buyer, the seller has an incentive to reduce the quality of the
goods she sells and thereby increase her profit.
Left unchecked, operation of the lemon principle in the relationship between the Solicitor
General (the seller) and the Supreme Court (the buyer) would reduce or eliminate their
interaction. The Solicitor General has the opportunity to reduce the quality of his advice-
to get a "bad" case onto the Court's docket on the strength of his reputation. The repetitive
nature of the Solicitor General's business in the Court, however, reduces the incentive to




The complexity of this relationship creates measurement difficulties. Nor-
mative approaches, such as the interview and anecdotal evidence collected
by Lincoln Caplan in The Tenth Justice,"5 provide a rich picture of the
Solicitor General's personality but generally ignore the Office's output-its
briefs. Yet the Solicitor General's briefs are much more fundamental to his
relationship with the Court than either his own public statements or those
of the Attorney General. Neglecting to consider them is equivalent to
considering a politician's press releases while ignoring her voting record:
the brief is the Solicitor General's final statement.
Of all the briefs the Solicitor General files, the amicus briefs are the most
revealing of political activity. Although the Solicitor General may take an
activist position when the government is a party, the bounded nature of the
dispute and the federal stake at issue limit the legal positions the government
may adopt. As an amicus, however, the government has both the freedom
to enter the case and the freedom to take any substantive position. If there
is political activism in the Solicitor General's Office, it is most likely to
appear in amicus filings.
II. A TAXONOMY OF BRIBFS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS AMcUs
Longitudinal analysis of institutional actors in the legal system is a
necessarily imprecise pursuit. As the country's social and legal environment
changes so do the sorts of cases that appear on the Supreme Court's docket.
To measure the change in an institution like the Solicitor General's Office,
then, one must either consider the concomitant changes in the legal envi-
ronment or construct a measure that is independent of the substantive issues
at stake. That the Solicitor General is now filing in fewer civil rights cases,
for example, reveals very little. There may be fewer cases being filed or
simply fewer novel issues being raised. Any measure linked to a particular
issue(s), therefore, is unstable across time. 6 I have examined the "interests
of the United States" in the cases the Solicitor General has chosen to
pursue, a method designed to avoid the difficulties caused by changes in
position or in the "type" of the case.
Changes in the Solicitor General's position on the merits of a particular
issue do not necessarily constitute activism but may simply represent a
difference of legal opinion. Many instances exist where different Solicitors
General reached different positions on the same point, 57 where the Office
55. L. CAPLAN, supra note 5.
56. An example of issue-related empiricism is O'Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of
the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDicATURE 256 (1983).
57. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-746)
(Rex Lee would not ask the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).) with Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379) (Charles Fried asked that
Roe be overturned even though the parties had not.).
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has changed its mind midstream, 5 and where the Office has supervised
amicus briefs that the Solicitor General has refused to endorse. 9 Indeed,
there is an expression of some political preference in almost every decision
the Solicitor General makes: which government cases should go forward,
when to file amicus briefs, and what to argue on the merits. Even where
the Court invites the Solicitor General to express the government's views,
he remains free to take a position that is either expansive or contractive of
federal power. Neither the Court nor the parties expect that an amicus
curiae will be a literal "friend of the court."
Broadly viewed, disputes about the appropriate behavior of the Solicitor
General can be placed into two categories: disputes concerning political
control of the Office, and more generally, disputes about the role for the
federal government in the legal development of social policy. Although the
former evades measurement,6 ' instances of the latter do not. The Solicitor
General's success rate6 shows the federal government hefts a good deal of
weight in the Supreme Court. The circumstances under which the govern-
ment chooses to use that weight, therefore, is of great interest not only to
those on the opposing side but to students of the government and the
Court.
A. Federal Amicus Briefs in Aggregate
I have taken all the amicus briefs filed by the federal government in cases
that have resulted in opinions on the merits62 during three periods that are
generally considered highwater marks in the legal activism of the executive. 63
The first period encompasses the 1935 to 1938 Supreme Court terms, when
58. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Solicitor General's
Office changed its position between consideration of jurisdiction and the merits in apparent
response to administration pressure. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 51-64.
59. In the Brief for the United States at 1, Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574 (Nos. 81-
1, 81-3), Acting Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace inserted a footnote saying, "The Acting
Solicitor General fully subscribes to the position set forth on question number two, only."
In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), Solicitor General Sobeloff refused to sign the
government's brief or to argue the merits before the Supreme Court. Another Justice
Department lawyer took the case instead. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 10-12. This is
known as "tying a tin can" and generally serves as a negative cue to the Court.
60. See, e.g., Clegg, Book Review: The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DuxE L.J. 964,
965 ("Caplan's argument that the Solicitor General's independence suddenly has eroded is
necessarily anecdotal; it would of course be impossible to quantify.").
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. Although the Solicitor General files briefs at both the jurisdictional level and on the
merits, older volumes of the Records and Briefs of Cases Decided by the United States Supreme
Court do not contain briefs for cases that did not reach the merits.
63. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-81 (1988); Silber, The
Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An
Oral History, 100 HAgv. L. REv. 817 (1987) (interview with Philip Elman of the Solicitor
General's Office from 1944 to 1961).
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Stanley Reed was Solicitor General under President Franklin Roosevelt.
During this time, the President was engaged in a protracted battle with a
conservative Supreme Court over the constitutionality of his New Deal
legislation. The second period includes the 1954 to 1957 terms, during which
time both Simon Sobeloff6 and J. Lee Rankin65 served as Solicitors General
under President Eisenhower. The period is distinguished by the federal
government's involvement in the school desegregation case, Brown v. Board
of Education." Brown not only illustrates the pre-legislation civil rights
cases but is often cited as precedent for contemporary government activity
in social policy cases. 67 The third period spans the 1984 to 1987 terms,
during which Rex Lee6 and Charles Fried69 served as Solicitors General in
the Reagan administration. The Reagan Justice Department filed several
controversial amicus briefs supporting, among other things, the reversal of
Roe v. Wade,70 the constitutionality of a state statute creating a mandatory
"moment of silence" in public schools, 71 and the use of public school
facilities by religious groups 22
The government's amicus briefs filed during the three periods can be
divided into three general categories of decreasing "federal interest. ' 73 The
first category of federal interest, which I have labeled "direct," includes
those cases that invoke the Solicitor General's interest in the construction
and interpretation of various federal codes. Generally these are cases where
64. February 1954 to July 1956.
65. August 1956 to January 1961.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Silber, supra note 63, at 824-44.
67. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 60, at 965-66.
68. August 1981 to June 1985.
69. October 1985 to June 1989. Fried has been replaced by Kenneth Starr, a former
judge of the Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
70. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 747 (Nos. 84-495, 83-1379).
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Nos. 83-812, 83-929).
72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bender v. Williamsport Area School
Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (No. 84-773).
73. The basic notion that the federal government's interests in cases may be grouped
was apparent to Solicitor General Lee.
I divided the non-government cases into two categories. The first class of
cases-the easier one-consisted of those that involved direct federal law
enforcement interests. Examples are Title VII cases, antitrust cases, securities
cases, voting cases or criminal cases, in which the federal government did not
happen to be one of the litigants, but the holding in the case would probably
have a larger impact on the interests of the United States than it would have
on the immediate parties.
The harder cases fall in the second category: cases that have nothing to do
with any federal law enforcement responsibility, but which fall right at the
core of the current administration's broader agenda. For me these included
cases involving obscenity, the religion clauses, and abortion.
Lee, supra note 5, at 599.
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the Solicitor General asserts an interpretation of a statute,74 treaty,7 5 or
regulation. 76
The second category consists of those cases where a decision regarding a
state issue may affect a complementary federal issue.7 7 Here, the federal
interest is not as strong or unique, but rather implied. Many of these cases,
especially in recent years, concern aspects of state court procedure that
might have federal trial implications. The Reagan Solicitors General, for
example, took a special interest in state cases involving the fourth and fifth
amendments to the Constitution and narrowing the exclusionary" and
Miranda doctrines.7 9
The third group of cases, in which the Solicitor General's involvement is
most activist, are those cases involving state issues that are independent of
any contemporary federal practice or interest. These cases typically affect
social policy around the country, but do not otherwise involve the federal
government. They are cases which may be of particular interest to the
President, but in which the federal government has no special interest or
expertise. These are briefs filed in the public interest as the Solicitor General
sees it. Examples include school desegregation 0 and abortion."'
74. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Power Commission as Amicus Curiae, City of Tacoma
v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) (No. 509) (ambit of the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. 791a-828c (1989)).
75. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the Securities Exchange Commission as
Amicus Curiae, Societe Nationale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (No.
85-1695) (use of the Hague Evidence Convention in federal courts).
76. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Atkins
v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (No. 85-632) (construction of a Health and Human Services
regulation regarding Medicare payments).
77. Where a party has directly attacked the constitutionality of a federal statute, the
Solicitor General may intervene as a party rather than appear as an amicus. See SUP. CT.
R. 28.4(b).
78. See, e.g., the Briefs for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567 (1988) (No. 86-1824); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (No. 86-5324);
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (No. 85-608); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)
(No. 85-889); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (No. 83-859); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (No. 83-712).
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence which is illegally seized not be used at trial.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holds that the police must appraise the
subject of a custodial interrogation of his fifth amendment rights. See, e.g., the Briefs for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (No. 86-
7059); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (No. 87-354); Colorado v. Spring, 479
U.S. 564 (1987) (No. 85-1517); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (No. 85-899);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) (No. 84-1485); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (No. 83-773).
80. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
81. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747 (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416 (No. 81-746).
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Table I shows the number and distribution of amicus briefs filed by the
federal government in cases that reached decision on the merits during the
three time periods. The data show a marked increase in the number of
briefs filed by the federal government, but they also show a change in the
nature of the cases selected. During the 1984 to 1987 Supreme Court terms,
the Solicitor General more than doubled the percentage of his briefs which
had only an implied federal interest. In "public interest" cases, supporters
of the Reagan Solicitors General correctly note that there is some precedent
for government participation. 2 Yet it is significant that even during these
periods of executive pressure on the Court, the actual number of such briefs
has been quite small. 3 In both the implied and the public interest categories
the data suggest there has been no assault on the boundaries of federal
interest, but rather an erosion.
Table I. Federal Interest as Amicus
in Cases Considered on the Merits
Level of Federal 1935-1938 1954-1957 1984-1987
Interest % (n) % (n) % (n)
1. Direct 81 17 77 10 57 68
2. Implied 14 3 15 2 38 45
3. Public 5 1 8 1 5 6
Total 21 13 119
Source: Records and Briefs of Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
Change of this nature is emergent. Its evolution is punctuated by excep-
tional cases of activism, but the underlying process is apparent in aggregate
not anecdotal accounts. Government briefs in abortion and school prayer-
public interest-cases only add to the attention these cases already receive
when they reach the Supreme Court. These exceptional instances are then
easily labeled as the rule rather than the exception, obscuring the real
process. As the data in Table I illustrate, however, these public interest
82. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 60, at 965-66.
83. From the 1984 through 1987 terms, for example, the Solicitor General filed only six
such briefs, five percent of government amicus briefs filed in cases considered on the merits
during the period. Those amicus briefs include: Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (No.
85-1551) (state statute requiring "moment of silence" in public schools); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (No. 85-993) (free exercise clause and state
unemployment statute); Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (No. 84-1667)
(application of the first amendment in schools); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747 (Nos. 84-495,
84-1379) (constitutional validity of abortion); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 38 (Nos. 83-812, 83-929)
(state statute mandating a minute of public school day reserved for "silent prayer"); T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 325 (No. 83-712) (constitutional requirements for searches on school grounds).
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briefs belie the importance of the expansion of somewhat less adventure-
some, but far more numerous implied interest briefs.
B. The Court's Response
The government is interested in winning its arguments before the Court,
and to a lesser extent in using the Court as a forum for its views. In either
case the Court's respect for the Solicitor General's Office is of great
importance to the government. Evaluating the Supreme Court's response to
changes in the Solicitor General's Office, however, is a difficult task. Only
in rare instances does the Court react explicitly to a particular amicus brief
of the government.14 Even where members of the Court have allegedly
spoken about the changes in the Solicitor General's Office, denials have
quickly followed."
Aside from the Solicitor General's win/loss record, which conflates too
many factors to be useful here, there are two empirical ways the Court
reacts to the Solicitor General. The first is the number of invitations the
Court extends to the government to file amicus briefs, and the second is
the Court's response to government motions to participate in oral argument
as an amicus.
1. Invitations to File Amicus Briefs
Other than granting certiorari, invitations to file an amicus brief are the
only part of the Court's order list that require less than a majority vote.
By standing informal agreement, the votes of three Justices are required to
invite an amicus brief.8 6 Yet this "rule of three" seems unnecessary as the
Justices can ignore any amicus brief, and seem willing to allow any colorable
amici to file a brief.8 7 The rule is significant, however, in that almost all
of the Court's amicus invitations are extended to the Solicitor General.88
84. The Court does occasionally react negatively to the Solicitor General's legal analysis.
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55 (1986) ("The United States ... isolates a
single line in the court's opinion and identifies it as the court's complete test .... We read
the District Court opinion differently.").
Justice Blackmun negatively characterized the government's amicus brief in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), as "amazing." Kamen, Pro-
Abortion Ruling's Author Confident of its Survival, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1985, at A25,
col. 1.
85. Caplan alleges that a majority of the Court (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) told him they felt "sadness and distress" about the changes in the Solicitor
General's Office. L. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 265. After their retirements, both Burger and
Powell publicly denied any such sentiment. Lauber, supra note 11, at 22.
86. Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to author (Mar. 17, 1989).
87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
88. Letter from Justice Blackmun to author (Mar. 16, 1989).
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As I have suggested above 9 there are several reasons why the Court
conceives of the Solicitor General as different from other members of its
bar: The Solicitor General assists the Court by screening government appeals,
answering requests for briefs and encouraging legal craftsmanship. Yet the
Solicitor General operates with a small staff and handles a large case load.
If there were no minimal procedural hurdle to inviting a brief the Court
might find itself with a "tragedy of the commons" problem. 9° The "rule
of three" safeguards the value of the Solicitor General's work as a common
resource by preventing any single Justice from soliciting a government brief
simply on a perception that the Solicitor General supports the Justice's
position in a particular case. 91
Implicit in this argument is the utility of the Solicitor General's work.
Not only do the Solicitor General's briefs generally display careful reasoning,
but they putatively represent the opinion of the United States government.
The clarity of the Solicitor General's voice and the significance of his client
lend the Solicitor General's arguments a certain power in the Court's
dialogue. 92 The government's brief may buttress a party's weak presentation,
provide appropriate support for decision of an issue not argued by the
parties, or simply represent the majoritarian viewpoint. The function, if not
the intent, of the rule of three is to limit the use of the government's
influence, especially where the federal interest is turbid.
Regardless of its intended purpose, the rule of three ensures that amicus
invitations are extended only in the types of cases where the Court values
the government's opinion. The data presented in Table II show the rela-
tionship between the number of amicus invitations and the strength of the
federal interest for the cases in each time period. As the Table illustrates,
the Court is much more solicitous of the government's views when the
federal interest is direct and unqualified. Where that interest is implied or
public, the Court shows great reluctance in asking the Solicitor General to
file an amicus brief.
89. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
90. A situation which creates a "tragedy of the commons" (also known as a "prisoner's
dilemma"), is one in which individuals acting in their individual self-interest will achieve a
sub-optimal result for the group as a whole. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 Sci. 1243 (1968); see also R. HAsRiN, COLLEcT=w ACTION (1982).
91. Other institutional litigants such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund or the American
Medical Association are also theoretically susceptible to overuse. Their interests and their
usefulness to the Court, however, are so much more narrow than the interests of the federal
government that the problem is unlikely to occur.
92. The government's amicus briefing of the constitutional issues in Robinson v. Florida,
378 U.S. 153 (1964), was significant enough to provoke an exceedingly rare dissent from
the Court's invitation to the Solicitor General. Robinson v. Florida, 375 U.S. 918 (1963)
(Black, Clark, Harlan and White, JJ., dissenting).
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Table II. Supreme Court Invitations
to the Solicitor General
Level of Federal 1935-1938 1954-1957 1984-1987
Interest All Inv. All Inv. All Inv.
1. Direct 17 2 10 5 68 29
2. Implied 3 2 2 0 45 0
3. Public 1 0 1 1 6 0
Total 21 4 13 6 119 29
Source: Records and Briefs of Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
A notable exception to this pattern was the Court's request that the
federal government file an amicus brief in the 1954 case Brown v. Board
of Education.93 Strong public sentiment about racial integration in the
schools and the incumbent questions about the difficulty implementing
integration and the costs to the Court's institutional legitimacy encouraged
the Court to postpone overturning Plessy v. Ferguson94 for some time.
Newly appointed Chief Justice Warren wanted to ensure that Brown would
be a unanimous decision by the Court, and that the decision would be
supported by the executive who would have to enforce it. The Court's
invitation to the Solicitor General was designed to secure this support,
and was delayed until the Court was assured the government's brief would
favor integration.95 The Court wanted to avoid making the decision more
of a "hot political issue" 96 and further to ensure that "both the present
and former Presidents of the United States . . . [were] publicly on record
as having urged the Court to take the position it [did]." ' 97
Brown was a special case, a rare instance where the Court encouraged
the government to file an amicus brief in the public interest. The govern-
ment's views in Brown were important to the Court not because it needed
help with the legal task, but because it needed help with the political task.
In Brown the Court exploited its own importance as a forum by inviting
the government to file a brief supporting integration. For these reasons,
Brown is a special sort of public interest case. Although the Court must
anticipate that its invitations to the government in public interest cases
will blur the proper boundaries of federal interest, it may not welcome
regular uninvited public interest briefs from the government.
93. 347 U.S. at 483.
94. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
95. Silber, supra note 63, at 824-26.




2. Government Participation in Oral Arguments
An additional way in which the Court indicates its regard for the
Solicitor General's Office is its response to motions by the Solicitor General
to participate in oral argument as an amicus. Rule 38.7, which provides
for oral argument by amici, warns that "[a]ny such motion will be granted
only in the most extraordinary circumstances," 98 but the Court has gen-
erally been more receptive to government requests to participate than to
similar requests by private parties.99 The Rule's stiff language is propor-
tional to the greater burden that oral argument places on the Court's
resources. While the Justices may ignore an amicus brief, they must attend
oral argument. Thus a majority vote, rather than the rule of three, is
necessary to approve an amicus' request for oral argument.
The Supreme Court rules were changed in 1954 to allow oral argument
by amici.100 Because amicus participation in oral arguments has only
recently become commonplace, however, there is little longitudinal data.
If the Solicitor General's participation in public interest cases has precip-
itated a loss of prestige for the Office one might expect the Court to
refuse motions to participate in oral argument where the substance of the
case does not implicate a direct federal interest. The data in Table III,
however, indicate that the Court has not responded this way. In fact, the
Court is quite willing to allow the Solicitor General to participate in oral
arguments, granting the great majority of such motions.
Table III. Government Motions
to Participate as Amicus in Oral Argument
Level of Federal 1954-1957 1984-1987
Interest Granted Denied Granted Denied
1. Direct 3 0 42 9
2. Implied 0 0 25 3
3. Public 0 0 1 2
Total 3 0 68 14
Source: Records and Briefs of Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court
98. Sup. CT. R. 38.7.
99. See R. STERN, E. GRassmA & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 573. "An amicus other
than the Solicitor General is seldom permitted to participate in oral argument, and then
only by special leave of Court and usually after obtaining the consent of the party supported
by the amicus to share some of that party's argument time." Id.
100. Before 1954, amici were not allowed to participate in oral arguments. See Sup. CT.
R. 44, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. I 1952).
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Table III shows, as Table II did, that the Solicitor General has not
overwhelmed the Court with adventursome claims of federal interest. Of
the three public interest cases the government asked to participate in
during the 1984 through 1987 Supreme Court terms, the Court allowed it
to do so in only Wallace v. Jaffree.'0' In Jaffree, which involved an
Alabama statute providing public school time for a moment of silent
prayer, the Court questioned the Alabama attorney general only about
Alabama state law and the statute's legislative history. The Court then
questioned Deputy Solicitor General Bator about the statute's constitu-
tionality. Neither the Court nor Mr. Bator raised the appropriateness of
the government's presence. Instead, the Court used Mr. Bator as a con-
stitutional expert, having him address the central issue, the statute's
constitutionality. Although the Court resolved the issue against him, the
colloquy left the impression that the Court viewed Mr. Bator's presence
as helpful, a serious contribution to the Court's consideration of the
issue. 10
Again, these data do not support the theory that changes in the Solicitor
General's amicus filings have precipitated any hostility from the Court.
Rather, the Court appears to be quite selective about granting the Solicitor
General's requests to participate in oral arguments as an amicus at all
levels of federal interest.
CONCLUSION
The data show two trends rather strongly. First, the Solicitor General's
Office has become gradually more activist, expanding the number of cases
it enters where the federal interest is not direct. Second, the data show
the Court has not reacted to these changes in any forceful way. Rather,
the Court continues to allow the Solicitor General great latitude to file
amicus briefs, while relying on the Solicitor General's work only when it
is to the Court's advantage to do so.
The Court has not lost faith in the Solicitor General's integrity. The
relationship between the Court and the government has too much inherent
101. 472 U.S. at 38. The Court denied the government's motion to participate in oral
arguments in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747, and Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675.
102. The oral argument in Jaffree contrasts markedly with that in Bender, 475 U.S. at
534, where the government was also an amicus. The issue in Bender was the use of public
school facilities by student religious groups. The federal interest was the constitutionality of
the Equal Access Act. Four Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) had
filed an unprecedented dissent from the order granting the government's motion to participate
in oral argument. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 472 U.S. 1015 (1985). Solicitor
General Fried began his argument by addressing the strength of the federal interest in the
Bender case and spent much of the rest of his time reiterating that interest. The Complete
Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: 1985 Term, 18-24 (microfiche).
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stability-is too symbiotic-to be pushed into one of mutual distrust by
a few politically motivated amicus briefs. If members of the Court are
experiencing "sadness and distress"' 13 about the expansion of the govern-
ment's participation as amicus, there is no indication of it in the record
of their rulings regarding the Solicitor General.'1 The Court continues to
invite the Solicitor General to file amicus briefs in a growing number of
cases, and given the government's success rate on the merits, 05 it appears
that these briefs are given serious consideration. The Court's rulings on
the government's motions to participate in oral argument indicate its
willingness to listen to the government's views, even where the federal
interest is not clear and direct; where the Court finds the Solicitor General's
participation in oral argument inappropriate or uninformative it has been
quite willing to deny his motion. As Solicitor General Rex Lee said when
asked about the appropriateness of a government brief, "at the end of
the day, the ultimate decision is still for the courts.'
'0 6
The Solicitor General remains an important contributor to the devel-
opment of the law; the government participates in many of the most
important cases before the Court, and the Court respects its arguments.
This is so even though there is little question that the Solicitor General
has become more activist. The contemporary Solicitor General files more
amicus briefs than did his predecessors, and is more willing to file in cases
where the government's interest is attenuated. The tension in the Solicitor
General's Office between the President and the Supreme Court is increas-
ingly being resolved in favor of the President.
Yet this political resolution leaves the Office's institutional structure
intact. The Solicitor General still protects the Court's docket by refusing
to appeal the vast majority of the government's losses below, and still
maintains a standard of quality in his work product. The Court minimizes
the effects of change in the Solicitor General's view of the federal interest
by distinguishing those briefs which are statements of a social or political
agenda from those which have a direct federal interest. Where the Court
finds the government's views pertinent, it invites a brief. Where it does
not, it is free to ignore any brief the government may file and it may
deny permission to participate in oral argument. Should the Court even-
tually find even ignoring the government's amicus briefs to be onerous, it
may change Supreme Court Rule 36.4 to require the Solicitor General to
adhere to the consent requirement.'0 7 Though the Solicitor General may
103. See supra note 85.
104. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
106. Greenhouse, Abortion Restriction Cases Argued Before High Court, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 1982, at B4, col. 1.
107. Currently the Solicitor General is the only litigant not required to have the Court's
permission before filing an amicus brief. See Sup. CT. R. 36.4.
1990]
696 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:675
increasingly become the President's mouthpiece, it is the Court that
provides him with a stage and an audience, and it is the Court that will
control his influence and indirectly his behavior.
